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 I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Carefully parsing the text and purposes of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, this Court has “consistently eschewed an expansive 
reading of the statute that would render unlawful conduct ‘magically … lawful 
when [conducted] online.’”  Panel Opinion, 918 F.3d at 683 (quoting Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Instead, this Court has applied Section 230 to preclude 
liability only where an ordinance or cause of action “inherently requires the Court 
to treat” an internet provider as the “publisher or speaker” of content provided by a 
third party.  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009).   
The panel correctly applied this Court’s precedent to hold that the City of 
Santa Monica’s “Home-Sharing Ordinance” – an essential element of City efforts 
to preserve housing in the face of rising residential rents and unauthorized vacation 
rentals  –  is not preempted by Section 230 because it hinges liability on neither 
status nor conduct as a publisher.  The Ordinance “does not proscribe, mandate, or 
even discuss the content of the listings that the Platforms display on their websites” 
and prohibits only “processing transactions for unregistered properties.”  918 F.3d 
at 682-83.   
The petition for rehearing should be denied.  The panel’s acceptance at face 
value of the Platforms’ assertion that, for their own business reasons, they would 
choose to avoid application of the Ordinance by removing listings rather than 
declining booking transactions does not convert the Ordinance into one that 
inherently treats the Platforms as publishers or speakers.  The Supreme Court has 
rejected as overbroad such an “effects-based test” that would preempt claims 
simply because they “induce” conduct at odds with a statutory scheme.  Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445-46 (2005).  For good reason.  To apply 
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 2 
such a test would expand Section 230 into what this Court has repeatedly stated it 
is not: “a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party content” that 
would be an “all-purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user 
content on the internet” and “give online businesses an unfair advantage over their 
real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general applicability.”  
Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2016); Barnes, 570 
F.3d at 1100; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15.  Congress did not provide 
such broad protection 23 years ago when the internet was in its infancy; there is no 
basis for this Court to provide it now, when the internet has evolved from “a fragile 
new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by 
overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar 
businesses” to become “the dominant – perhaps the preeminent – means through 
which commerce is conducted.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15.   
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Panel Properly Recognized the Limits on Section 230’s Preemptive 
Scope 
In determining a statute’s preemptive scope, the “purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone.”  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (citation 
omitted). “[T]he statutory language … necessarily contains the best evidence of 
Congress’ preemptive intent.”  Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 
260 (2013) (citation omitted).  “Also relevant, however, is the structure and 
purpose of the statute as a whole, as revealed not only in the text, but through the 
reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended 
the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, 
and the law.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (citation omitted).    
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Applying these principles, this Circuit and others have held that Section 230 
preempts liability only for: (1) “a provider or user of an interactive computer 
service” (2) “whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a 
publisher or speaker” (3) “of information provided by another information content 
provider.”  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 850 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., FTC 
v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016); Jane Doe 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016). 
Though Section 230’s enactment was prompted by a defamation case, “the 
language of the statute does not limit its application to defamation cases.” Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1101.  “[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action … but 
whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as 
the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.”  Id. at 1101-02.  The 
publication activities protected by Section 230 involve “reviewing, editing, and 
deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content.” 
Id. at 1102; see also Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852 (“efforts, or lack thereof, to 
edit, monitor, or remove user generated content”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1170-71 (“any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude 
material that third parties seek to post online”).1  
These limits on Section 230’s preemptive reach reflect a recognition that it is 
“not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”  Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1164.  It is not “an all-purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses 
that publish user content on the internet” and does not declare “a general immunity 
from liability deriving from third-party content.”  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852-
                                           
1 Other Circuits are in accord.  See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 
F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Green v. AOL, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
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53; accord City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 
2010).  Preemption is properly limited to the statute’s “narrow language and its 
purpose” because “we must be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity 
provided by Congress.”  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (citation omitted). 
The panel correctly applied these limits to hold that Section 230 does not 
preempt the Ordinance because it prohibits and penalizes only non-publishing 
conduct – commercial booking transactions for unlicensed short-term rentals.  As 
the panel recognized, “the Ordinance does not proscribe, mandate, or even discuss 
the content of the listings that the Platforms display on their websites” and “does 
not require the Platforms to monitor third-party content.”  918 F.3d at 682-83.    
B. The Panel’s Holding That Section 230 Does Not Preclude Required 
Monitoring of Internal, Non-Public Information Is Consistent with 
Circuit Precedent.     
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1032-34 (9th Cir. 2003), holds that Section 
230 applies only where a third-party furnishes its information to an internet service 
provider “under circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position of the 
service provider … would conclude that the information was provided for 
publication on the Internet.”  Batzel thus confirms that Section 230 does not 
preempt liability based on a platform’s actions with respect to internal customer 
information it knows was not provided for publication.   
The panel’s decision comports with Batzel in declining to apply Section 230 
preemption because “the only monitoring that appears necessary in order to 
comply with the Ordinance relates to incoming requests to complete a booking 
transaction – content that, while resulting from the third-party listings, is distinct, 
internal, and nonpublic.”  918 F.3d at 682 (emphasis omitted).  The Platforms 
concede that they do not publish on their websites the owner and address 
information from their customers.  See Airbnb FAC ¶ 42, ER 1840; Airbnb FAC ¶ 
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116, ER 1857; HomeAway FAC ¶ 34, ER 1872.  Thus, determining whether a 
requested booking transaction involves a licensed home-share would require the 
Platforms only to compare two sets of information, neither taken from a published 
third-party listing: (a) the owner name and address for the property being booked 
(drawn from unpublished internal customer records); and (b) the owner names and 
addresses listed on the Santa Monica registry (derived from information 
independently gathered by the City).    
Nor is there any conflict with the other cases the Platforms cite.  Internet 
Brands allowed a failure to warn claim because it would “not require Internet 
Brands to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors 
such content.”  824 F.3d at 851.  The court recognized that requiring Internet 
Brands to warn its users by email would fall outside the preemptive scope of 
Section 230.  Id.  Internet Brands’ need to pull user-provided email addresses to 
provide a warning is equivalent to the Platforms’ need to pull user-provided 
property address information to compare to the City-published registry – Internet 
Brands makes clear that neither implicates monitoring of published user content 
within the scope of Section 230’s preemption.2   
The Platforms cite a reference in Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 Fed. Appx. 
586 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2019) (unpublished), to “direct messages” in claiming that 
                                           
2  The language from Internet Brands cited by the Platforms (Petition at 15) 
comes from the court’s recognition that, unlike two other cited cases that held 
Section 230 applicable to different tort claims, the “tort duty asserted here does not 
arise from an alleged failure to adequately regulate access to user content or to 
monitor internal communications that might send up red flags about sexual 
predators.” 824 F.3d at 853.  As the two cited cases make clear, the “internal 
communications” referenced in this sentence were actually communications 
between sexual predators and minors over the providers’ websites.  See Doe II v. 
MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 573, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 156-57 (2009); 
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416, 419-20 (5th Cir. 2008).   
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other circuits have “held that the CDA preempts claims based on monitoring 
internal content.”  Petition at 15.  But as the underlying district court opinion 
demonstrates, the reference to “direct messages” is to messages that were 
distributed between users over Grindr’s smart phone app, Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 
306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2018),3 and hence were published 
through the app.  See also Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 975 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016) (“private nature of Direct Messaging does not remove the transmission 
of such messages from the scope of publishing activity under section 230(c)(1)”).    
 None of these cases questions Batzel’s holding.  Indeed, Fields recognizes 
that Batzel resolves “what it means for content to be ‘provided’ by a third party,” 
200 F. Supp. 3d at 975, a prerequisite for monitoring of that content to implicate 
Section 230.  As the panel correctly held, because the only monitoring required by 
the Ordinance is of internal, non-public information that the Platforms know is not 
provided for publication, Section 230 does not apply. 
C. The Panel Opinion Does Not Conflict with Other Circuits’ Limited 
Protection of Websites’ “Design and Operation.”  
Relying on Backpage and Herrick,  the Platforms argue that the panel 
opinion conflicts with “First and Second Circuit decisions holding that the CDA 
preempts local laws that regulate ‘features that are part and parcel of the overall 
design and operation of [a] website.”  Petition at 12.  These cases, however, apply 
Section 230 to decisions about design features only where those decisions reflect 
                                           
3 Resort to the district court opinion is necessary because the Circuit’s 
unpublished summary order, which has no precedential effect, “assume[s] the 
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts.”  765 Fed. Appx. at 588.  The 
Platforms cite Backpage as also holding that Section 230 applies to monitoring of 
“direct messages.”  While that case nowhere references “direct messages,” it does 
discuss “message forwarding services,” 817 F.3d at 16, 21, which similarly appears 
to refer to messages forwarded between users through Backpage’s website.   
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“choices about what content can appear on the website and in what form.”  
Backpage, 817 F.3d at 20-21; see also Herrick, 765 Fed. Appx. at 590-91.  These 
cases have no application here because the Ordinance prohibits the Platforms only 
from completing booking transactions for unlicensed home-shares, regardless of 
what content may or may not be posted on the Platforms’ sites relating to those 
home-shares.4     
D. The Panel Opinion Does Not Conflict with Supreme Court or Circuit 
Preemption Precedent  
The Platforms do not dispute the panel’s recognition that, on its face, the 
Ordinance “does not proscribe, mandate, or even discuss the content of the listings 
that the Platforms display on their websites.”  918 F.3d at 683.  The Platforms 
acknowledge that verifying whether a particular short-term rental property appears 
on the City’s registry “could be done” “after publication but prior to processing the 
payment and transaction for the listing.”  Airbnb FAC ¶¶ 67, 69, ER 1847; see also 
Homeaway FAC ¶ 37, ER 1873.  They assert, however, that this option is “not 
viable from a business standpoint.”  Airbnb FAC ¶ 69, ER 1847-48; see also 
Homeaway FAC ¶37, ER 1873.  Thus, as the panel accepted, the Platforms assert 
that, for their own business reasons, they would “choose” to remove non-compliant 
listings from their sites, rather than leave them in place and perform checks at the 
time of proposed bookings.  918 F.3d at 683.5   
                                           
4 The Platforms’ contrary reading of the design feature protection recognized 
by Backpage would extend Section 230 protection to a website’s participation in 
booking (and taking a percentage of the booking payment for) sex acts arising from 
posts.  Section 230 cannot apply this broadly. 
5 The Platforms also allege that they would “have to” monitor, screen, and 
remove listings prior to publication.  Airbnb FAC ¶ 70, ER 20; see also 
HomeAway FAC ¶ 4, ER 1866.  The panel correctly held that it was not bound by 
this allegation because it was an incorrect legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation.  918 F.3d at 683 n.3.          
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In arguing that this warrants preemption, the Platforms assert an overbroad 
test.  In Bates, addressing a federal statute with a broader preemptive reach that 
barred states from imposing any pesticide labelling requirements “in addition to or 
different from” federal requirements, the Court rejected as “unquestionably 
overbroad” an “effects-based test” under which the statute would preempt any state 
law claim that would “induce a manufacturer to alter its label.”  544 U.S. at 444-
46.  Courts have similarly rejected an inducement test for other broad preemption 
statutes, including ERISA.  See, e.g., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 
570 U.S. 472, 492 (2013) (“As Bates makes clear, ‘[t]he proper inquiry calls for an 
examination of the elements of the common-law duty at issue; it does not call for 
speculation as to whether a jury verdict will prompt the manufacturer to take any 
particular action.”); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 
520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997) (any state law “that increases the cost of providing 
benefits to covered employees will have some effect on the administration of 
ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such an effect 
is pre-empted by the federal statute”); Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 
637, 647 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Nor does a state law meet the ‘related to’ test for 
FAAAA preemption just because it shifts incentives and makes it more costly for 
motor carriers to choose some routes or services relative to others, leading the 
carriers to reallocate resources or make different business decisions.”) (emphasis 
omitted).  Consistent with these cases, the panel correctly held that, even accepting 
that complying with the Ordinance would impose costs that would induce the 
Platforms, for their own business reasons, to remove listings, this is “insufficient to 
implicate the CDA.”  918 F.3d at 683. 
The cases the Platforms cite do not conflict with the panel opinion.  Wos v. 
E.M.A. ex rel Johnson, 568 U.S. 627 (2013), is a straightforward example of 
conflict preemption.  A federal statute generally preempted states from imposing 
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liens on Medicaid beneficiaries’ tort recoveries, except for the portion representing 
payments for medical care.  A North Carolina statute created an irrebuttable 
presumption that a third of each tort recovery was payment for medical expenses.  
The Court held this statute preempted because it would “allow the State to take 
one-third of the total recovery, even if a proper stipulation or judgment attributes a 
smaller percentage to medical expenses,” in conflict with the Medicaid anti-lien 
provision.  568 U.S. at 638.  The Court disregarded North Carolina’s effort to 
“define” away the conflict through its irrebuttable presumption because “a proper 
analysis requires consideration of what the state law in fact does, not how the 
litigant might choose to describe it.”  Id. at 637.  Here, the panel focused precisely 
on what the Ordinance “in fact does,” recognizing that it does not “inherently 
require[] the court to treat [the Platforms] as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content 
provided by another,” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102, and rejecting the Platforms’ effort 
to base preemption on economic inducement rather than actual compulsion.      
National Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012), involved FMIA’s 
wide-sweeping preemption clause that, unlike Section 230, precluded “not just 
conflicting, but also different or additional state requirements.”  565 U.S. at 459-
61.  Disregarding the comprehensive federal regulations governing slaughterhouse 
treatment of non-ambulatory pigs, the state statute sought “at every turn” to impose 
“additional or different requirements on swine slaughterhouses” and so to 
substitute “a new regulatory scheme” for that in place under the FMIA.  Id. at 460. 
It was in this context that the Court rejected the State’s argument that its ban on 
sales of non-ambulatory pig meat offered only an “incentive” to slaughterhouses to 
take non-ambulatory pigs out of the production process.  As the Court explained -- 
“this argument mistakes how the prohibition on sales operates within [the state 
statute] as a whole.  The sales ban is a criminal proscription calculated to help 
implement and enforce each of the section’s other regulations – its prohibition of 
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receipt and purchase, its bar on butchering and processing, and its mandate of 
immediate euthanasia.”  565 U.S. at 463-64.   
The wide-ranging regulatory provisions of the state statute led the Court to 
hold the otherwise permissible sales ban was “something more than an ‘incentive’ 
or ‘motivat[or]’” and instead functioned “as a command to slaughterhouses to 
structure their operations in the exact way the remainder of [the state statute] 
mandates.”  Id. at 464.  In contrast, neither Section 230 nor the Ordinance 
implements a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the Platforms.  
National Meat thus poses no conflict with the panel’s recognition, consistent with 
Bates, that while the Ordinance’s regulation of booking services may impose costs 
that lead the Platforms to choose to remove listings, this does not convert the 
Ordinance into a regulation of publishing activity preempted by Section 230.   
The Platforms’ reliance on Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 
475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), is misplaced for several reasons.  First, the case 
relies on a limited exception to the Supreme Court’s general rejection of 
preemption premised on economic inducement that is rooted in the breadth of 
ERISA’s preemption clause, which, unlike Section 230, implements a form of field 
preemption; any rule derived from Fielder and the Supreme Court cases on which 
it relies, therefore, is properly limited to field preemption.  See Metropolitan 
Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“rule derived from these cases is that a local law is preempted” if it 
“indirectly regulates within a preempted field in such a way that effectively 
mandates a specific, preempted outcome”) (emphasis added).  This rule is not 
properly extended beyond its field preemption context.  See Beaver v. Tarsadia 
Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170, 1180 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (“unnecessarily broad reading” of 
prior case has resulted from incorrectly “extending its reasoning” outside its “field 
preemption context”). 
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Second, even if Fielder has application outside the field preemption context, 
this Court has declined to adopt or reject Fielder, noting that the majority opinion 
was “over a forceful dissent.”  Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 659 (9th Cir. 2008).  The Fielder dissent 
rejected the majority’s conclusion that “the only rational choice employers have 
under the Fair Share Act is to structure their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as 
to meet the minimum spending threshold,” 475 F.3d at 193, and found Wal-Mart’s 
claim that it would increase benefits rather than pay the alternative state fee 
“irrelevant because the choice to increase benefits is not compelled by the Act.  
That choice would simply be a business judgment that Wal-Mart is free to make.”  
475 F.3d at 202-03 (dissent).   
Finally, even if Fielder has application outside the field preemption context 
and its majority opinion is assumed correct, preemption would remain improper 
because the Platforms have a “meaningful alternative” to comply with the 
Ordinance without removing listings from their sites.  The Platforms’ own 
allegations show that they can verify the legality of bookings after publication at 
the time of booking.  They assert this is “not viable from a business standpoint” 
because their websites “would be highly confusing” if  “populated by listings that 
guests could not actually book” and because users would experience unexpected 
booking delays if the Platforms “had to screen listings prior to payment and 
transaction processing to ensure that the rental is listed on the City’s registry.”  
Airbnb FAC ¶ 69, ER 1847-48.  The harms the Platforms allege render this option 
unviable can be mitigated by posting a warning (general or specific to particular 
listings) to notify users that (a) the Platforms cannot book unlicensed home shares 
in Santa Monica; and (b) there will be some delay in determining whether booking 
can be completed because the Platforms have to verify licensing.  As Internet 
Brands makes clear, such warnings would not be publishing activity within the 
Case: 18-55367, 07/01/2019, ID: 11350483, DktEntry: 103, Page 16 of 21
 12 
scope of Section 230 because the source of the information to generate the 
warnings (even if directed to specific listings) would be the City’s registry.   
E. The Panel’s Rejection of the Platforms’ Obstacle Preemption Argument 
Poses No Conflict with This Court’s Precedent  
Contrary to the Platforms’ claim, the panel acknowledged the various 
purposes cited as support for Section 230, including “to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by 
Federal or State Regulation.” 918 F.3d at 683-84 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)).  
But the panel also correctly recognized that, while acknowledging these purposes, 
this Court’s decisions “have hewn closely to the statutory language of the CDA 
and have limited the expansion of its immunity beyond the protection Congress 
envisioned.”  Id. at 684.  Indeed, the very cases on which the Platforms rely note 
these purposes but nevertheless recognize strict textual limits on Section 230’s 
preemptive scope.  See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165-71; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 
1032-34.   
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “no legislation pursues its purposes 
at all costs.”  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 12 (2014) (citation omitted).  
The argument for applying obstacle preemption is “particularly weak” where, as 
here: (1) the Ordinance legislates in an area of traditional state regulation, housing, 
triggering the presumption that “federal law was not intended to supersede the 
states’ historic police powers ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress,’” Arellano v. Clark County Collection Service, LLC, 875 F.3d 1213, 
1216 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 18-19); see also Bates, 544 
U.S. at 449; (2) “the level of generality at which [Section 230’s] purpose is 
framed” is very broad, Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 18; and (3) the text of Section 230 
is narrow and expressly recognizes and permits most state regulation, id.; see also 
47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State 
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from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.”); Internet 
Brands, 824 F.3d at 853 (“Congress could have written the statute more broadly, 
but it did not.”).  All of this further supports the panel’s rejection of obstacle 
preemption in favor of following this Court’s prior decisions, which make clear 
that Section 230’s text and purposes permit regulation of the Platforms’ non-
publishing activities. 
F. The Panel Opinion Poses No Significant Risk to the Modern Internet 
Economy  
The Platforms’ claim that the panel opinion poses grave risks to internet 
commerce rings hollow.  Not only have the Platforms voluntarily complied with a 
nearly identical San Francisco ordinance, just last term the Supreme Court 
recognized that “the Internet’s prevalence and power have changed the dynamics 
of the national economy” and in the prior year “e-commerce grew at four  times the 
rate of traditional retail, and it shows no sign of any slower pace.”  South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018).  Noting that in 1992 the Court “could 
not have envisioned a world in which the world’s largest retailer would be a 
remote seller,” the Court overturned its own longstanding precedent that had 
applied a cramped physical presence standard to limit local authorities’ ability to 
tax online sales, rejecting online sellers’ arguments that doing so would threaten 
Internet commerce by exposing start-ups and smaller companies “to the daunting 
complexity and business-development obstacles of nationwide sales tax 
collection.”  Id. at 2097-98; see also Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852-53 (alleged 
“chilling effect” on internet does not warrant expansive reading of Section 230).  
The Platforms’ similar arguments here provide no valid basis for concern that the 
panel’s narrow opinion, in full accord with Section 230’s text, Congressional 
intent, and this Court’s prior precedents, will somehow threaten the vast modern 
Internet economy.   




For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should deny the petition for 
rehearing. 
Dated: July 1, 2019   Respectfully submitted, 
      LANE DILG 
      City Attorney 
      By: //s// George S. Cardona   
             GEORGE S. CARDONA 
       Special Counsel/Chief of Staff 
      Attorneys for Appellee 
      City of Santa Monica 
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